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Instrumental behavior depends on both goal-directed and habitual mechanisms of choice.
Normative views cast these mechanisms in terms of model-free and model-based methods
of reinforcement learning, respectively. An influential proposal hypothesizes that model-
free and model-based mechanisms coexist and compete in the brain according to their
relative uncertainty. In this paper we propose a novel view in which a single Mixed Instru-
mental Controller produces both goal-directed and habitual behavior by flexibly balancing
and combining model-based and model-free computations. The Mixed Instrumental Con-
troller performs a cost-benefits analysis to decide whether to chose an action immediately
based on the available “cached” value of actions (linked to model-free mechanisms) or to
improve value estimation by mentally simulating the expected outcome values (linked to
model-based mechanisms). Since mental simulation entails cognitive effort and increases
the reward delay, it is activated only when the associated “Value of Information” exceeds
its costs.The model proposes a method to compute the Value of Information, based on the
uncertainty of action values and on the distance of alternative cached action values. Overall,
the model by default chooses on the basis of lighter model-free estimates, and integrates
them with costly model-based predictions only when useful. Mental simulation uses a sam-
pling method to produce reward expectancies, which are used to update the cached value
of one or more actions; in turn, this updated value is used for the choice. The key predic-
tions of the model are tested in different settings of a double T-maze scenario. Results are
discussed in relation with neurobiological evidence on the hippocampus – ventral striatum
circuit in rodents, which has been linked to goal-directed spatial navigation.
Keywords: model-based reinforcement learning, hippocampus, ventral striatum, goal-directed decision-making,
exploration-exploitation, value of information, forward sweeps
1. INTRODUCTION
Goal-directed decision-making describes choice as depending on
the evaluation of action-outcome contingencies (Balleine and
Dickinson, 1998). Consider the case of a thirsty rat facing a T-maze
with water in its left end. When behavior is controlled by goal-
directed mechanisms of choice, the rat goes left because it predicts
a water outcome (expectancy), and wants to reach it (goal state).
Goal-directed mechanisms are considered to be very flexible as
they rapidly readapt choice after changed conditions (e.g., devalu-
ation of stimuli previously associated with high value). In contrast,
habitual choice mechanisms rely on fixed stimulus-response reac-
tions arising after extensive training. Consider again the case of
the rat in the T-maze. If it has been rewarded a sufficient number
of times for going left, it will tend to choose left again even if there
is no reward. Compared to goal-directed mechanisms, habitual
mechanisms are less flexible (e.g., they readapt very slowly after
devaluation) but also faster and less demanding.
Normative views of animal behavior cast habitual and goal-
directed mechanisms of choice in terms of model-free and model-
based methods of reinforcement learning (RL), respectively (Daw
et al., 2005). Model-free methods use “cached” action values
to choose actions (i.e., aggregated values that can be recalled
quickly). A long tradition of experimental and theoretical work
in neuroscience uses model-free methods of RL, and in partic-
ular temporal-difference (TD) methods (Schultz et al., 1997), Q
learning (Watkins and Dayan, 1992), and actor-critic architectures
(Houk et al., 1995), to explain essential aspects of decision circuits
such as dopamine bursts and the functioning of the basal ganglia.
Model-based methods use instead internal forward models to
mentally simulate future action possibilities and their associated
values. Model-based mechanisms are well known in the reinforce-
ment learning literature (Sutton and Barto, 1981, 1998) and are
nowadays increasingly studied in neuroscience and neuroeconom-
ics in relation to perceptual, value-based, and economic choices
(Pezzulo et al., 2007; Glimcher et al., 2009; Daw, 2012; Pezzulo
and Rigoli, 2011; O’Doherty, 2012; Solway and Botvinick, 2012).
Here we focus on goal-directed spatial navigation, which has been
linked to the hippocampus – ventral striatum circuit in the rodent
brain. It has been reported that rats navigating in mazes stop at
decision points and turn the head in one of the possible directions,
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then to the other. When they turn their heads, place cells in the
hippocampus “sweep forward” in the corresponding branch of
the maze, as if the rat had really moved in that direction (Johnson
and Redish, 2007). In correspondence of forward sweeps, ven-
tral striatum activation is observed as well (van der Meer and
Redish, 2009). Based on such evidence, it has been proposed that
the hippocampus – ventral striatum circuit implements a mental
simulation mechanism that realizes goal-directed choice, with the
hippocampus linked to forward modeling and the ventral stria-
tum linked to the evaluation of covert expectations of rewards
constructed by the hippocampus (van der Meer and Redish, 2009,
2010, 2011; Battaglia et al., 2011; Pennartz et al., 2011; Chersi and
Pezzulo, 2012; Erdem and Hasselmo, 2012; Penner and Mizumori,
2012; van der Meer et al., 2012). This view links well with the idea
of a “vicarious trial and error” mechanism in rats (Tolman, 1948).
Habitual and goal-directed mechanisms of choice coexist and
interact in the brain (Balleine and Dickinson, 1998). However, the
proximal mechanisms that are responsible for their interactions
are incompletely known. An influential theory proposes a contin-
uous competition between habitual and goal-directed mechanisms
of choice (implemented as two separate controllers) regulated by
their relative uncertainty (Daw et al., 2005; Niv et al., 2006; Dayan,
2009). This theory captures the key role of uncertainty in the arbi-
tration of goal-directed and habitual mechanisms of choice, and
can reproduce (among the other things) the effects of habitization,
or the gradual passage from goal-directed to habitual mechanisms
after sufficient learning (Balleine and Dickinson, 1998). Mecha-
nistically, this is due to the fact that the initial uncertainty of the
habitual controller (compared to the goal-directed one) is higher
(as it learns less efficiently from experience) but becomes lower
after sufficient learning. This theory assumes that the model-free
and model-based controllers are actively engaged in every decision
(although ultimately only one of them is selected) and therefore it
cannot explain why the hippocampal forward sweeps, putatively
associated with model-based computations, vanish with habitiza-
tion (van der Meer and Redish, 2009). Furthermore, this theory
does not consider that model-based computations might have
costs, linked to the cognitive effort due to planning (Gershman
and Daw, 2011) and to the temporal discounting of rewards due
to the time required for planning (Shadmehr, 2010).
We propose that a single instrumental process of decision-
making produces both goal-directed and habitual behavior by
flexibly combining aspects of model-based and model-free com-
putations. We call this system a Mixed Instrumental Controller
(MIC). At decision points, the MIC performs a cost-benefits analy-
sis, comparing the advantage of mental simulation (in terms of
improving reward information) with its costs. More specifically,
the MIC calculates the Value of Information (VoI ; Howard, 1966)
of mental simulation on the basis of uncertainty and of how much
the alternative “cached” action values differ against each other.
Then, the Value of Information is compared against the cost of
mental simulation (in terms of cognitive effort and time). As a
consequence of this, goal-directed mechanisms (mental simula-
tions) are activated only when necessary, in line with evidence
on rats’ forward sweeps. In sum, the MIC combines model-
based and model-free computations and does not lend itself to
a complete separation of goal-directed and habitual controllers
FIGURE 1 |The rat navigation scenario used in the simulations: a
doubleT-maze.
(in the strict sense devised in Daw et al., 2005); hence the label
“mixed.”
In the rest of the article, we introduce the proposed Mixed
Instrumental Controller model and test it in a simulated rat naviga-
tion scenario, in which decisions (going right or left) correspond
to the selection of a branch in a double T-maze; see Figure 1.
Rewards can be allocated at any of the seven points indicated as
S1–S7. This scenario permits studying how selection of habitual
vs. goal-directed processes at decision points changes as a function
of learning, and to link elements of the model to neurobiological
findings in rodents.
2. METHODS: THE MIXED INSTRUMENTAL CONTROLLER
MODEL
Figure 2 illustrates the algorithm followed by the mixed instru-
mental controller model. This algorithm can be separated in
four sub-processes, called meta-choice (between cached values
and mental simulation), mental simulation, choice, and learning.
Below, we describe each sub-process in details.
2.1. META-CHOICE BETWEEN CACHED VALUES AND MENTAL
SIMULATION
At decision points (S1, S2, and S3), the agent (a simulated rat)
has to decide whether to turn right or left. The agent has stored
a prior estimate of each action value (Q value, see Watkins and
Dayan, 1992), together with an estimate of each Q value uncer-
tainty. Based on this information, at decision points, the agent
first chooses whether to mentally explore the action consequences,
in order to improve the action value estimates, or to simply rely
on prior Q value estimates. This process can be viewed as a meta-
choice between habitual (corresponding to“cached”Q values) and
goal-directed processes (corresponding to mental simulation). At
every decision point, this meta-choice is performed separately for
each action (going left and right). In other words, the system
might mentally simulate only the more uncertain action(s), not
necessarily all.
This meta-choice amounts to computing the Value of Infor-
mation (VoI ; Howard, 1966) obtained with a mental simulation
related to a given action Act1 (e.g., going left at a decision point
when left or right actions are possible). As solving an optimal
solution to this problem is generally intractable in non-stationary
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition March 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 92 | 2
Pezzulo et al. The Mixed Instrumental Controller
FIGURE 2 | Overview of the mixed instrumental controller (MIC).
environments, to determine VoIAct1 we adopt a simpler method
described in equation (1):
VoIAct1 = CAct1|QAct1 − QAct2| +  (1)
This equation indicates that, for each action, our model con-
siders two elements: (1) the difference between the QAct1 value
and the QAct2 value of the alternative action (plus an  to ensure
that the sum is non-zero); (2) the uncertainty (CAct1) relative to
QAct1. The ratio between the two elements represents the estimated
VoIAct1 obtained with mental simulation. This value is compared
with the cost of mental simulation, which can be thought to be
connected to the cognitive effort due to search (Gershman and
Daw, 2011) and the temporal discounting of rewards due to the
passing of time (Shadmehr, 2010). This cost is implemented here
as a fixed threshold γ .
2.2. MENTAL SIMULATION
When VoIAct1 is smaller than the threshold γ , the agent relies on
the cachedQAct1 value estimates for choice. On the contrary, when
VoIAct1 is bigger than the threshold, forward sweeps are performed
to simulate the effects of possible action executions. These simu-
lated effects are then considered as pseudo-observations and are
used to improve the estimation of QAct1.
Figure 3 shows the graphical model (Dynamic Bayesian Net-
work; Murphy, 2002) used for mental simulation (see Botvinick
and An, 2008; Dindo et al., 2011; Pezzulo and Rigoli, 2011; Solway
and Botvinick, 2012 for related models). Nodes represent ran-
dom variables including policies (pi), actions (A), belief states (S),
rewards (R), pseudo-observations (O) along with their temporal
index t. Arrows connecting nodes indicate conditional probabili-
ties among corresponding variables. Mental simulation consists in
“clamping” current state and policy nodes (in other words, in con-
sidering these nodes as observed), and compute the conditional
aggregated “value,” which depends on the rewards gained at every
time steps. The clamped policy at the first time step corresponds to
the simulated action, while the policies clamped at following time
steps are randomly chosen with equal probability. For instance, at
FIGURE 3 | Graphical model for mental simulations, unrolled for three
time steps. Filled nodes are “clamped” (i.e., considered as observed)
during mental simulation (seeTable 1).
S1 the agent could simulate the “going left” action by clamping the
policy of going left at the first time step, and clamping a random
policy (e.g., going right) at the second time step.
Mental simulations are repeated for several times, and every
time the computed value is stored. The number of simulations is
proportional to uncertainty (CAct1); the proportion is regulated
by a parameter λ. In addition, the number of simulated time steps
for every simulation depends on uncertainty as well. Specifically,
when uncertainty is higher than a threshold ζ , the agent simulates
a sequence of actions (i.e., a whole path in the T-maze) and uses
rewards to compute its aggregated value. Alternatively, the agent
simulates a shorter path (whose length is regulated by a parameter
η) and retrieves the Q value of one of the actions associated to
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Table 1 | Nodes of the graphical model of Figure 3.
Node Explanation Values
pi Policies {S1→ left, S2→ left, S3→ left} . . . {S1→ right,
S2→ right, S3→ right}
A Actions Left, right (or equivalently: Act1, Act2)
R Rewards [0 . . . n]
S Belief states S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, S6, S7
O Pseudo-
observations
[0 . . . n]
the last simulated state. This Q value incorporates the cumulative
expected value from that state on, rather than only the value of the
state (i.e., it is a return and not a reward in reinforcement learning,
see Sutton and Barto, 1998). Values relative to future states are
discounted with a factor δ.
Once all mental simulations have been executed, the computed
values are considered as pseudo-observations (O1, O2, . . ., On,
one for each simulation) and are used to improve the estimate of
QAct1. The stored value is used as a prior(QPriorAct1 ) and the pseudo-
observations are used to compute a posterior value (QPosteriorAct1 ).
This computation is described by equation (2) (assuming that the
distribution variance of the QAct1 value is known and is equal to
1, see Bishop, 2006):
QPosteriorAct1 =
QPriorAct1 + CAct1 ·
∑N
i=1 Oi
1+ CAct1 · N (2)
where CAct1 is the uncertainty, namely the prior variance on the
mean of theQPriorAct1 value distribution,Oi is the pseudo-observation
i, and N is the number of pseudo-observations.
2.3. CHOICE
At every decision point, a choice between actions is made by con-
sidering the value of the different possible actions (QAct1 and
QAct2). Note that this value can be either the cached Q value (if
mental simulation was not used) or the posterior Q value cal-
culated with equation (2) (if mental simulation was used). The
choice is made according to the following softmax equation:
P (Action = Act1|QAct1,QAct2)
= exp (β · QAct1)
exp (β · QAct1)+ exp (β · QAct2) (3)
where QAct1 and QAct2 are the Q values relative to the two possible
actions (say going left or right at a decision point), and β is the
inverse temperature parameter.
2.4. LEARNING
The MIC has two forms of learning.
2.4.1. On-line learning of C and Q values
Once the agent executes an action, he moves toward a new posi-
tion and, in some cases, collects a reward. On the base of this novel
experience, the agent learns. First, the QAct1 value corresponding
to the executed action is updated. The obtained reward, which
FIGURE 4 | Graphical model for learning C and Q values, unrolled.
is summed up to the Q value corresponding to the best action
associated to the new position, is considered as an observation O.
This observation is used to estimate the Q value at the follow-
ing trial using the generative model represented by the graphical
model shown in Figure 4. At every trial x, the prior QAct1,x value
and uncertainty CAct1,x are used by a particle filtering algorithm
to compute the QAct1,x+1 value and the uncertainty CAct1,x+1 at
trial x + 1. The prior QAct1,x value considered here is the “cached”
QAct1 value that is available before mental simulations (if any)
were made.
The specific particle filtering algorithm is the following: for
n= 1 to N, random vectors [CAct1,nQAct1,n] are sampled from
the prior Gaussian distributions of uncertainty N ∼ (CAct1,x , k)
(where k is a known parameter) and of Q value N ∼ (QAct1,x ,
CAct1,n). Then, the sampled vectors are weighted proportionally
to P(OAct1,x /QAct1,n). After this, N vector samples are drawn
from the previous vector set, each with a probability propor-
tional to its weight. Finally, the posterior uncertainty is com-
puted as CAct1,x+1=∑CAct1,n/N and the posterior Q value as
QAct1,x+1=∑QAct1,n/N.
2.4.2. Value learning
The model uses a model-based method to learn state values (i.e.,
the rewards R in the graphical model shown in Figure 3). Every
time a reward is encountered in a state s, the mean of the expected
reward conditional to that state R(s)x+1 is updated according to
equation (4):
R(s)t+1 = R(s)t + α (Robserved − R (s)t ) (4)
where α is a learning rate.
3. RESULTS OF THE SIMULATIONS
We tested the MIC model in five simulated experiments. In
the simulations, an artificial agent faced a double T-maze (see
Figure 1) and, for several trials, had to choose twice to go either
right or left. The simulations tested two key predictions of the
model. First, we expected that the MIC model was able to learn the
correct policy based on available rewards. Second, we expected that
the MIC model executed forward sweeps only in certain circum-
stances, namely when the VoI was high. Specifically, we expected
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Table 2 | Parameters and constants used in all the simulations.
Label Explanation Value
α Learning rate for the model-based value
representations
0.2
β Inverse temperature parameter of the
softmax function
0.4
γ Threshold for mental simulation 0.5
– Discount factor 1
 Small number used in the VoI to avoid
division by zero
0.0001
ζ Threshold relative to uncertainty for
shortening the mental simulation
3
η Length of the simulation when
uncertainty is lower than ζ
1
– Starting reward values for the
model-based representations
1
– Initial value of uncertainty in the
simulations
4
κ Uncertainty variance 1
λ Number of forward sweeps during mental
simulation
C×3
– Prior Q values at the first trial 1
to observe forward sweeps at the beginning of learning in all sim-
ulations. In addition, forward sweeps were expected to gradually
decrease and disappear in simulations where variances were small
and/or alternative Q values were not close to each other (sim-
ulations 1, 2, 4), contrary to simulation 5 where variances were
high and alternative Q values were close to each other. Finally,
we expected forward sweeps to reappear following unexpected
changes in reward (simulation 3), and to decrease and disappear
again as learning proceeded. In all the simulations, we assumed
that the agent already knew the transition function, namely the
conditional probabilities of outcomes given previous states and
actions in the graphical model shown in Figure 3. The parameters
and constants used in all the simulations are shown in Table 2.
3.1. SIMULATION 1: SIMPLE AND STABLE ENVIRONMENT WITH LOW
VARIANCE
In the first simulation, a reward having a mean of 5 (r= 5)
was placed at S7 (i.e., top right), while other positions had zero
mean reward. Reward variance was relatively small for all posi-
tions, namely 0.2. The aim of this experiment was studying the
gradual transition from goal-directed to habitual mechanisms of
choice as a function of learning. Indeed, in stable environments, a
given sequence of actions (in this case, right-right) is always rein-
forced and, after a certain amount of learning, can be selected by
using habitual mechanisms, without the effort entailed by mental
simulations. We hypothesized, as experience increased, a decrease
in number and length of mental simulations (corresponding to
goal-directed control), leading to relying on prior Q estimates
(corresponding to habitual control).
Figure 5 describes the experimental results. Figure 5A shows
the probability of choosing left turns at S1, S2, and S3. It shows a
rapid decrease of preference for left turns at S1 and S3, as it was
expected given that reward could be collected with two right turns.
Turning right or left at S2 was equiprobable as neither S4 nor S5
were rewarded. Figure 5B shows the value of uncertainty along
trials for going right at S1, which diminished rapidly. Figure 5C
shows the number of samples used for the mental simulation for
going right at S1, which is proportional to uncertainty. A value of
zero indicates that the mental simulation is not used at all. Our
results show that, during learning, mental simulations decreased
in number, suggesting a gradual shift from goal-directed to habit-
ual control. Moreover, Figure 5D indicates that, along learning,
the length of forward sweeps decreased as well. The mechanisms
tested in the present simulation can explain why learning in stable
and simple environments produces habitization, which parallels a
reduction (in number and length) of hippocampal forward sweeps
and covert expectation of reward in ventral striatum (van der Meer
and Redish, 2009). The development of habits entails also a “shift”
of activation in dorsolateral striatum from actual reward locations
to decision points and then to starting points (Jog et al., 1999). In
our framework, this corresponds to the states in which the agent
is highly confident of acquiring reward (i.e., at S7 before learning,
at S3, and successively at S1 after learning).
3.2. SIMULATION 2: COMPLEX AND STABLE ENVIRONMENT WITH
LOW VARIANCE
In the second simulation, multiple rewards were placed in the
maze: S2 (r= 2), S4(r= 1), S7 (r= 5). Like in the previous sim-
ulation, reward variances were relatively small (0.2). The goal of
this simulation was to test whether the agent was able to shift from
goal-directed to habitual control in a more complex environment.
Figure 6 describes the results. Figure 6A indicates that the agent
was able to learn the correct policy. Figure 6B shows a decrease
in uncertainty along learning for the action “going right” at S1.
Figures 6C,D indicate that both the number and length of forward
sweeps diminished along learning. The results of this simulation
show that the MIC model can choose adaptively even in envi-
ronments that have multiple rewards. In addition, due to the low
reward variance, the model habituated (i.e., diminished forward
sweeps) almost as fast as simulation 1. Compared to simulation 1,
the choice of actions was more variable, matching the amount of
rewards at different branches of the T-maze. This is due to the use
of a softmax rule, which selects actions in proportion to their Q
values rather than always selecting the action having the highest Q
value.
3.3. SIMULATION 3: NON-STATIONARY ENVIRONMENT
In the third simulation, a single reward (r= 5) was initially placed
at S7, and then moved to S4 after 50 trials. Reward variances were
relatively small (0.2). The aim of this simulation was studying
how the model re-adapts to novel contingencies. In other words,
the agent had to learn an action sequence (right twice) and, after
contingencies had changed, to re-learn a novel action sequence
(left twice).
Figure 7 describes the results. Figure 7A shows that the policy
was updated correctly in correspondence with the introduction
of novel contingencies (Balleine and Dickinson, 1998). Figure 7B
indicates that uncertainty decreased from trial 1 to 50, but, at
this point, it increased again because previous contingencies had
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FIGURE 5 | Results of simulation 1, simple and stable
environment with low variance, for 100 trials. (A) (top left) Shows
the probability of going left at S1, S2, and S3 during the trials. (B) (top
right) Plots the uncertainty for going right at S1. (C) (bottom left)
Shows the number of forward sweeps (associated to mental
simulation) used for the choice at S1; zero means that mental
simulation is not used. (D) (bottom right) Shows the length of forward
sweeps used for the choice at S1.
changed. This pattern was mirrored by the number and length of
forward sweeps, shown in Figures 7C,D. These results show that
the habitual system takes control in stationary environments but,
after surprising outcomes are encountered, goal-directed mecha-
nisms (corresponding to mental simulations) are activated again,
due to a rapid uncertainty increase. This pattern of results sug-
gests a specific prediction done by the MIC model in relation to
the mechanisms regulating forward sweeps in rats, which requires
empirical testing.
3.4. SIMULATION 4: SIMPLE ENVIRONMENT WITH HIGH VARIANCE
In this simulation, mean rewards were as in simulation 1 (i.e., r= 5
at S7), but with 5-times larger variances (var= 1). We hypothe-
sized that uncertainty was bigger and less stable in this condition,
compared to simulation 1. Figure 8 describes the results. Figure 8A
shows that the agent learned the correct policy (although beliefs
were less stable compared to simulation 1). Figure 8B confirms
that uncertainty was bigger and less stable than simulation 1.
Figures 8C,D shows that, at the beginning of learning, mental
simulations were activated for more trials compared to simula-
tion 1. This is consistent with the idea that forward sweeps in
the hippocampus are not only a function of experience (i.e., the
more experience, the less forward sweeps) but also a function of
environmental uncertainty (Gupta et al., 2010). However, with a
certain amount of learning, in this simulation the habitual system
took control as in simulation 1, and forward sweeps were no more
activated. The reason was that, although variance was high, the
environment was “simple.” In other words, the difference between
alternative Q values was big and the animal was quite confident
about the best choice to take. This pattern of results represents a
specific prediction of the MIC model, which requires empirical
testing.
3.5. SIMULATION 5: COMPLEX ENVIRONMENT WITH HIGH VARIANCE
In the last simulation, mean rewards were like simulation 2 (i.e.,
r= 2 in S2; r= 1 in S4, r= 5 in S7); however, in this case, reward
variances were bigger, namely they were equal to 1. The goal of
this simulation was to observe the artificial agent in a complex
environment with high variance. Figure 9 describes the results.
Figure 9A confirms that the agent was able to learn the correct
policy, although beliefs were more noisy than in simulation 2.
Figure 9B shows that uncertainty was bigger and less stable than
in simulation 2. This led to activate mental simulations along the
whole learning period (see Figures 9C,D) although to a larger
extent at the beginning. The use of mental simulations along
the whole learning period is caused by two factors. First, high
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FIGURE 6 | Results of simulation 2, complex and stable environment with low variance. (A–D): see Figure 5.
reward variance increased uncertainty. Second, in this simulation,
the environment was complex, namely different paths were not
much different to each other in terms of total reward. Indeed,
going left at S1 led to r= 3, whereas going right led to r= 5, which
are relatively close to each other. These results suggest that in com-
plex and uncertain environments the forward sweeps could persist
for a longer time, and the passage from goal-directed to habitual
strategies could be incomplete.
4. GENERAL DISCUSSION
The Mixed Instrumental Controller (MIC) is an integrative model
describing how model-based (mental simulation) and model-
free mechanisms (Q learning) could interact in both cooperative
and competitive ways, producing a continuum of habitual and
goal-directed strategies of choice.
In the Mixed Instrumental Controller, model-free mechanisms
are used by default and supported by model-based computa-
tions when the Value of Information of the latter surpasses its
costs; this is typically true when uncertainty is high and alterna-
tive cached action values are close to each other. Furthermore,
the relative contribution of model-based mechanisms can vary:
the less the uncertainty, the fewer the samples used to imple-
ment the forward sweeps. In sum, the MIC permits to flexi-
bly balance model-free and model-based methods depending on
environmental circumstances.
To decide when mental simulation is necessary, the Mixed
Instrumental Controller solves a “dilemma” that is similar to the
well known exploration-exploitation dilemma, except that in this
context the exploration is “mental” and not overt. Specifically,
the mental exploration consists in performing mental simula-
tions to access expectancies and associated reward predictions,
and ultimately to better estimate action values. The exploita-
tion consists in choosing an action on the basis of the already
available (“cached”) estimate of action values, rather than per-
forming mental simulation. The dilemma can be solved by com-
paring the Value of Information that can be retrieved using
mental simulation with the cost of the simulation. Computing
an optimal solution to this problem is generally intractable in
non-stationary environments, and it is still unclear if and how
the brain does so (Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005; Daw et al.,
2006; Pezzulo and Couyoumdjian, 2006; Behrens et al., 2007;
Cohen et al., 2007; Bromberg-Martin and Hikosaka, 2011; Niv
and Chan, 2011). The MIC model implements an approximate
solution to this problem that considers accuracy of choice (i.e.,
probability of acquiring higher reward) and uses a fixed cost of
acquiring information (in terms of cognitive effort and time); the
former factor favoring mental exploration, and the latter exploita-
tion. Overt exploration is not explicitly modeled in the MIC,
but it results from the adoption of a softmax function for the
choice.
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FIGURE 7 | Results of simulation 3, non-stationary environment. (A–D): see Figure 5.
Our simulations in environments having different character-
istics (stable or volatile, low or high variance) show that there
are multiple factors that can cause the Value of Information to
be higher, and most notably the variance and the difference in
value between the competing alternatives. Generally, mental sim-
ulations at decision points diminish after sufficient learning, in
line with evidence showing that in this condition habitization
replaces goal-directed mechanisms of choice (Jog et al., 1999).
However, if variance is high or if the values of the alternatives
are too close, the system is slower in developing habits. Dif-
ferent from alternative models, in the MIC the habitization is
accompanied by a reduced use of model-based computations;
this mechanism can explain why hippocampal-striatal forward
sweeps, possibly encoding covert simulations at decision points,
vanish after sufficient experience (van der Meer and Redish,
2009).
When environmental contingencies change, mental simula-
tions are used anew, consistent with evidence of a passage from
habitual to goal-directed strategies after outcome devaluation
(unless it occurs after“overtraining”). When contingencies change,
the goal-directed system can immediately change behavior. Fur-
thermore, changed environmental conditions increase the VoI and
speeds up the updating of C and Q values; see Figure 4. However,
the reaction to outcome devaluation can be slower (or impaired)
when actions are over-trained (Dickinson, 1985) because the
(non-active) goal-directed system cannot instruct an immediate
change of strategy and updating C and Q values takes longer.
It is worth noting that although the MIC model is sensible to the
volatility of the environment, this element is not explicitly modeled
(but, see below for a possible extension of the model). Finally, our
results in the more complex environments (with high uncertainty
and variance) are in keeping with evidence that forward sweeps
are not a simple replay of previous experience but are modulated
by task uncertainty (Gupta et al., 2010). Moreover, the MIC model
makes the further prediction that the difference between alterna-
tive cached action values has a role as well in influencing forward
sweeps.
5. CONCLUSION
We proposed that essential aspects of goal-directed and habit-
ual control can be captured within a single instrumental process
of decision-making, the Mixed Instrumental Controller (MIC),
which flexibly balances and combines model-based and model-
free computations. We linked the functioning of the MIC model
to a neural circuit formed by the hippocampus and the ventral
striatum, which has been shown to be active during goal-directed
navigation and the choice between spatially defined goals.
The MIC model elaborates on a previous influential model
(Daw et al., 2005; Niv et al., 2006; Dayan, 2009) which emphasizes
that goal-directed and habitual mechanisms of choice are linked
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FIGURE 8 | Results of simulation 4, simple environment with high variance. (A–D): see Figure 5.
to model-based and model-free methods of reinforcement learn-
ing, respectively, and which assigns a key role to uncertainty. At
the same time, the MIC departs from this model in that it assumes
that model-based calculations are only used when the Value of
Information they can furnish is higher than their costs. Another
distinguishing point is the fact that while in the previous theory
model-free and model-based processes produce two competing
instrumental controllers, in the MIC they act in concert. First,
although generally mental simulations are used to retrieve the
rewards associated to future states, they can also retrieve Q values
that permit to aggregate the value of several time steps, as it is typ-
ical of model-free algorithms. Combining these two methods (for
instance, performing forward search until a reliable cached value
is available) is typical in game playing set-ups (Baum and Smith,
1997) and understanding how the brain might do so is an impor-
tant avenue for future research (Glascher et al., 2010; Simon and
Daw, 2011a). Second, model-free and model-based processes pro-
vide complementary information to calculate action values. This
is evident if one considers that, in equation (2), the cached Q value
is used as a prior and updated using model-based calculations.
Another peculiarity of our model is the way mental simula-
tion is realized. In the MIC, mental simulation is computationally
implemented as a sequential sampling procedure using the graph-
ical model described in Figure 3. The method we adopt consists in
“clamping” one policy at a time (see Solway and Botvinick, 2012),
which produces a serial process of (simulated) internal experience
sampling. This method is different from the idea of a “tree search”
as it is typically described in normative approaches (Niv et al.,
2006), and from models of parallel “diffusion” processes for plan-
ning (Ivey et al., 2011). It produces a serial forward search that
better captures the nature of forward sweeps in the hippocampus
(see also Lengyel and Dayan, 2008; Bornstein and Daw, 2011).
Furthermore, the specific algorithm used for the forward search,
i.e., particle filtering, produces a (noisy) accumulation of evidence
about rewards, which links well to sequential sampling dynam-
ics used for perceptual decisions and memory search (Ratcliff,
1978) and the“ramping”activity of primate neurons during choice
(typically, in the neuronal areas that control the effectors used
for the choice; Shadlen and Newsome, 2001; Cisek and Kalaska,
2005; Ding and Gold, 2010). Overall, then, our mental simulation
system describes the value-based computations of the hippocam-
pus – ventral striatum circuit in terms that are analogous to those
of perceptual-based decisions, and are coherent with the idea of
“decision by sampling” (Stewart et al., 2006).
All these characteristics distinguish the MIC from the model
of Daw et al. (2005) and from several others, which we shortly
review below. Similar to the MIC, it has been recently proposed
that model-based computations are activated only when the Value
of Information they add is bigger than the cost of waiting they
entail (Keramati et al., 2011). Similar to the MIC model, the Value
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FIGURE 9 | Results of simulation 5, complex environment with high variance. (A–D): see Figure 5.
of Information is computed by considering the uncertainty and the
distance between alternative action values; however, different from
the MIC model the model-based component is expected to have
perfect information. The major difference between the model of
Keramati et al. (2011) and the MIC is that how model-based com-
putations are performed and used. Indeed, the former model shifts
completely from habitual to goal-directed control when the Value
of Information is sufficiently high. Conversely, the latter model
integrates “cached” values and model-based estimation, and thus
results in a “mixed” control. In addition, in the MIC model model-
based computations are performed using a serial sampling process;
the samples vary in number and length and model-based compu-
tations can be performed only for a sub-set of available actions.
These features have been adopted to fit better with the evidence
available on rats’ forward sweeps, which are thought to correspond
to model-based computations.
The aforementioned models (Daw et al., 2005; Keramati et al.,
2011) and others (Simon and Daw, 2011b) assume that model-
based and model-free methods can only compete, not cooperate.
The DYNA model is one of the few systems in which model-based
and model-free methods cooperate (Sutton, 1990). In DYNA, only
the habitual system is responsible for making decisions, but the
goal-directed system can train it by providing off-line predictions.
A recent study uses the DYNA system to explain the shift between
habitual and goal-directed systems and retrospective revaluation
(Gershman et al., 2012). In the MIC model mental simulations
are used on-line, during the choice, and are responsible for the
forward sweeps in the hippocampus at decision points. Below we
discuss a straightforward extension of the MIC model that uses
mental simulations both on-line and off-line.
An alternative view of the memory consolidation process is
that it consists in a chunking of action sequences. In this view,
model-free methods are not used: all actions are first executed in
a model-based way and then gradually chunked and transformed
into habits (Dezfouli and Balleine, 2012). Different from this the-
ory, the MIC uses both model-free and model-based methods, and
describes the transition from goal-directed to habitual behavior in
terms of changed Value of Information rather than chunking.
5.1. FUTURE IMPROVEMENTS OF THE MIC MODEL
There are several aspects of the MIC model that can be further
elaborated. First, the MIC currently uses simplified methods to
calculate Value of Information and the costs of simulation. The
method we devised has several limitations; for instance, it does not
consider the absolute value of the actions but only their relative
values, and only uses a fixed threshold. The current formal analyses
of Value of Information take some of these aspects into considera-
tion but are computationally impractical; furthermore, it is unclear
how they link to neural computations (Howard, 1966). As our
knowledge of how the brain addresses these problems increases,
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition March 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 92 | 10
Pezzulo et al. The Mixed Instrumental Controller
better methods can be devised that permit to quantify the costs and
benefits of mental exploration, and to realize a better cost-benefits
analysis.
The proposed model can be easily extended by permitting the
model-based part to train the model-free part off-line and in
absence of overt behavior, similar to other RL algorithms such
as DYNA (Sutton, 1990) and prioritized sweeping (Moore and
Atkeson, 1993). The values of C and Q can be updated even when
the agent is not acting by endogenously steering mental simula-
tions to produce “fake” reward observations O, and then using the
same learning methods as described in sec. 2.4. With this straight-
forward extension the MIC can benefit from both on-line and
off-line mental simulations using the same mechanisms. We chose
not to use off-line mental simulations in our experiments because
in the scenarios we simulated there could be too little time to com-
plete the off-line training within experimental trials (otherwise we
would never observe forward sweeps at decision points). Rather,
we hypothesize that off-line training could have a more promi-
nent role when there is enough time for memory consolidation
(e.g., during pauses and sleep, but also when there is enough time
between experimental trials). In the proposed “extended” version
of the MIC model, mental simulations support both decision-
making (when used on-line) and memory consolidation (when
used off-line). Indeed, there are various demonstrations that the
rat hippocampus replays (forward and backward) sequences of
neural activity experienced during overt behavior both when the
animal pauses (and is awake) and when it is asleep (Foster and
Wilson, 2006; Diba and Buzski, 2007; Koene and Hasselmo, 2008;
Peyrache et al., 2009; Gupta et al., 2010; Carr et al., 2011); still the
behavioral significance of these findings is disputed. Some studies
emphasize the importance of forward sweeps for decision-making
(van der Meer and Redish, 2009), while other studies highlight
the consolidation of recent memories into long-term memory
and the formation of “cognitive maps” of the environment (Tol-
man, 1948; O’Keefe and Dostrovsky, 1971; Morris et al., 1982). We
hypothesize that these apparently distinct views can be reconciled
if one considers the aforementioned distinction between on-line
and off-line uses of mental simulations in the MIC model. It is
worth noting that the precise mechanisms regulating off-line men-
tal simulations remain to be established. Off-line training could
be regulated by similar principles of optimization as in the meta-
choice we described. For example, the agent could simulate being
at a decision point, decide whether or not to activate the model-
based component using the Value of Information computations
of equation (1), and use the particle filtering algorithm of sec. 2.4
for training the habitual system. Alternatively, it could eschew the
Value of Information computations and only consider the accu-
racy of the habitual system (e.g., the variance of Q values) or more
simply try to systematically update all the Q values. The plausibility
of these and other hypotheses remains to be established.
The proposed model can also be improved by explicitly mod-
eling environmental volatility. The MIC is implicitly sensible to
volatility and changed reward contingencies. However, it is plausi-
ble that living organisms explicitly model volatility (Behrens et al.,
2007; Kepecs et al., 2008). In turn, an estimate of volatility permits
to better regulate the Value of Information (as in volatile environ-
ment uncertainty cannot be reduced using mental simulation), to
adjust learning rates adaptively, and to modulate the rate of overt
exploration (which is at the moment sidestepped using a parame-
terized softmax function). A related issue is considering the quality
of the internal model and the controllability of the environment
when choosing a controller; computational modeling studies sug-
gest that it might be favorable to select closed-loop methods in
well-modeled regions and open-loop methods in regions that are
not (or cannot) be modeled with high accuracy (Kolter et al.,
2010).
Another important direction for future studies is devising bio-
logically plausible and scalable algorithms to implement the pro-
posed model-based computations. At the moment, model-based
methods are computationally prohibitive for large state spaces, but
progresses on sampling methods (Doucet et al., 2000) and Monte
Carlo search (Silver and Veness, 2010) are encouraging. Not only
these methods are interesting from a computational viewpoint,
but they could also shed light on how mental simulations and for-
ward planning are mechanistically implemented in the brain, as
suggested by recent studies that link brain activity with probabilis-
tic computations (Ma et al., 2006; Doya et al., 2007) and sampling
methods (Fiser et al., 2010; Berkes et al., 2011).
Furthermore, the MIC uses model-based computations and
mental simulations for action selection and learning, but it leaves
unspecified if they can be also used for other purposes. An intrigu-
ing proposal is that mental simulations can be used to monitor
actions initiated by the habitual system until their successful com-
pletion (Alexander and Brown, 2011). This would permit a rapid
initiation of action, and also its subsequent revision if mental sim-
ulation uncovers negative consequences that the habitual system
did not take into consideration. It is worth noting that this mech-
anism could be another way how model-free and model-based
methods cooperate.
We have linked the model-based computations of the MIC
to a neural circuit formed by the hippocampus and the ventral
striatum. The reason for our choice is that this circuit has been
linked to goal-directed computations in spatial navigation (i.e.,
the scenario that we chose to exemplify the characteristics of the
MIC). However, it is plausible that the brain uses additional (or
different) neuronal circuits for model-based computations out-
side the spatial domain. We hypothesize that the MIC captures
essential principles of instrumental control that are not restricted
to goal-directed spatial navigation; however, understanding if the
model-based computations of the MIC apply to instrumental
choice at large remains an open objective for future research.
A further aspect to consider is how the MIC architecture could
potentially include Pavlovian mechanisms. In relation to this, two
possibilities should be considered. Pavlovian processes might sub-
stantially act in parallel with instrumental ones. Alternatively,
Pavlovian and instrumental representations might largely over-
lap. Although contrasting findings have been reported, evidence
suggests that Pavlovian and goal-directed values are segregated
functionally and neurally. For instance, following devaluation,
Pavlovian effects, contrary to goal-directed ones, are visible even
without incentive learning. Moreover, lesions of different portions
of amygdala, ventromedial prefrontal cortex, and striatum, have
differential impact on Pavlovian and goal-directed mechanisms
(Balleine and O’Doherty, 2009). Overall, this evidence suggests
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that Pavlovian and instrumental mechanisms work in parallel (see
also Rigoli et al., 2012), and future implementations of the MIC
should consider this fact.
Finally, the MIC model is currently limited in that it only con-
siders one level of granularity of actions and states. In contrast,
the control of behavior has been recently linked to hierarchical
reinforcement learning models (Botvinick, 2008; Botvinick et al.,
2009; Frank and Badre, 2012), in which actions can be specified
at different levels of abstractness and temporal extension (see
also Verschure et al., 2003). Extending the MIC with hierarchi-
cal action organization would provide extra flexibility, allowing
it, for example, to select and plan actions at more abstract levels,
and to connect with the growing literature on prefrontal control
hierarchies (Fuster, 1997; Koechlin and Summerfield, 2007; Wise,
2008).
5.2. REAL-TIME DYNAMICS AND PUTATIVE NEURONAL
ARCHITECTURE OF THE MIXED INSTRUMENTAL CONTROLLER
The MIC model offers a computational-level explanation of
the interactions between habitual and goal-directed processes of
choice in the context of spatial navigation. While the real-time
dynamics of mental simulation are explicitly modeled using the
particle filtering algorithm, the moment-by-moment dynamics
of the action selection process are sidestepped using the process
model described in Figure 2. Below we discuss how the MIC model
could implement real-time dynamics of choice through a neural
architecture.
We take as our starting point the affordance competition hypoth-
esis (Cisek and Kalaska, 2010): a parallel model of decision-making
that describes choice as a dynamic competition between two (or
more) action alternatives (say, go left or right). In the affordance
competition hypothesis, multiple plans for action are formed
in parallel and compete over time until one has sufficient sup-
port to win the competition. In terms of the MIC, the default
habitual processes (plausibly including mappings between stimuli
and motor representations) mediate this selection by instruct-
ing previously reinforced stimulus-response associations. In this
architecture, response dynamics correspond to the activity of neu-
ronal populations in frontoparietal cortex, forming a sort of motor
map for the potential responses (Cisek, 2006), whose selection is
plausibly supported by the basal ganglia (Redgrave et al., 1999;
Chersi et al., 2012; Lepora and Gurney, 2012). In the context of
spatial navigation and the choice between spatially defined goals,
the hippocampus is also involved to support (among the other
things) spatial representation and processing. During the choice,
the presence of an appropriate stimulus (say, the sight of a branch
of the T-maze) could produce a strong peak of activation in the
motor map in correspondence of the to-be-selected action. How-
ever, this is only effective when the stimulus-response associations
are strong enough (e.g., after habitization). When the potential
action plans have little support (e.g., before sufficient learning), or
when the choice is highly uncertain, the motor map could encode
several low-intensity and high variance peaks of activation. In
these cases, cognitive control and monitoring mechanisms could
inhibit action execution and allow for more information to be col-
lected via model-based computations, until confidence is high or
the costs of acquiring it surpasses the benefits.
In the MIC, there is not a univocal value representation, but
different aspects of valuation correspond to different parts of
the model; this is consistent with recent theories that recognize
the contribution of different brain areas to utility representation
and processing (Ito and Doya, 2011; Pennartz et al., 2011). State
values (and reward expectancies) could be associated to ventral
striatum (Lansink et al., 2009; van der Meer and Redish, 2009),
ventrotegmental area, basolateral amygdala, and orbitofrontal cor-
tex (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006; Yin et al., 2008; McDannald
et al., 2012). In our model, state values correspond to S→R tran-
sitions; in a previous work we have also shown how these values
can be modulated by the agent’s internal motivational state (Pez-
zulo and Rigoli, 2011). Dorsolateral striatum could encode cached
action values and could have a role in encoding uncertainty (Yin
et al., 2004; Kepecs et al., 2008; represented in our model by Q and
C, respectively). It is worth noting that although the dorsal/ventral
division of the striatum (which we also re-propose here) has been
associated to segregated habitual and goal-directed controllers,
respectively, our model does not necessarily imply a complete seg-
regation, but is compatible with the view that the controllers could
partially overlap. The mapping of specific parts of the striatum
with different computations (model-based and model-free) and
modes of control (goal-directed and habitual) is still controversial
(see Bornstein and Daw, 2011).
The MIC is consistent with the idea that the ventral striatum
supports model-based reward representations (activated during
forward sweeps), as suggested by van der Meer and Redish (2010).
This idea is distinct from the standard view that the ventral stria-
tum plays the role of “critic” in actor-critic RL theories, and is
recruited exclusively during learning (Houk et al., 1995). However,
the MIC is consistent also with an alternative possibility, coher-
ent with the ventral striatal role as “critic.” It is indeed possible
that this structure encodes the “fictive” prediction error which,
in the MIC model, is used to update prior Q “cached” values
with pseudo-observations produced by mental simulation. This
hypothesis generates the specific prediction that the signal in ven-
tral striatum correlates with the“fictive”prediction error (i.e., with
the discrepancy between “cached” and goal-directed values) rather
than with goal-directed values. By using devaluation, for example,
it could be possible to test these alternative hypotheses.
Another aspect of the MIC model is relative to the meta-choice,
the calculation of the Value of Information, and the cognitive con-
trol of the computations. A relatively simple form of cognitive
control has been linked to optimal stopping problems, in which it
is necessary to consider the confidence of actions and the cost to
be late before taking an action (Gold and Shadlen, 2001, 2007).
It has been argued that optimal stopping and more sophisticated
forms of meta-choice could be based on mechanisms for moni-
toring, uncertainty consideration and behavioral inhibition. With
these mechanisms, the architectures for action specification and
selection described before can become able of goal-directed choice
and cognitive control, consistent with the view that these more
advanced abilities could derive from elaborations of brain designs
that solve simpler sensorimotor processes (Pezzulo, 2008, 2011;
Pezzulo and Castelfranchi, 2009; Cisek and Kalaska, 2010; Cisek,
2012). In the MIC, these mechanisms could improve the choice by
permitting model-based mechanisms to support or even substitute
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the default habitual control mode. In the current implementa-
tion, this is done by mentally simulating and collecting covert
expectations of reward and goals, but anatomical considerations
point also to more sophisticated mechanisms such as mental time
travel and the construction of novel episodic memories (Schacter
et al., 2007, 2012; Buckner, 2010). Although the neural under-
pinnings of the control architecture are incompletely known, we
speculate that monitoring processes in the anterior cingulate cor-
tex could signal the opportunity to overcome stimulus-bound
responses (Botvinick et al., 2001; Alexander and Brown, 2011),
the Value of Information computations could reuse cached action,
and uncertainty values, and the passage from stimulus-bound to
internally generated (simulated) contexts necessary for the model-
based computations could be linked to rostral prefrontal cortex
(Burgess et al., 2007).
These and other aspects of brain implementations of goal-
directedness remain open objectives for future research. Indeed,
our study is part of a large initiative investigating model-based
decision-making in the brain (Balleine and Dickinson, 1998; Daw
et al., 2005; Dayan, 2009; Green et al., 2010; Rao, 2010; Daw,
2012; Pezzulo and Rigoli, 2011; Simon and Daw, 2011b; Sol-
way and Botvinick, 2012). Model-free RL methods have provided
useful insights to study the neural neurobiology of action val-
ues and habitual behavior. Analogously, model-based RL mech-
anisms could help studying the neural underpinnings of men-
tal simulations, outcome predictions, and goal-directed choice
(O’Doherty, 2012). It is important to consider that there are
many possible variants of model-based RL methods (as there are
multiple forms of model-free RL computations), possibly link-
ing to different neural substrates (Daw, 2012). So, it remains
to be evaluated what computational proposals better capture
the brain’s ability to flexibly choose and act in a goal-directed
manner.
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